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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume IX SPRING-SUMMER 1960 Number 2
CHATTEL MORTGAGES IN ILLINOIS v. SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
RAY D. HENSON
A RTICLE 9, Secured Transactions, of the Uniform Commercial
ACode is the broadest statute ever proposed in the field of the
law regulating security interests in personal property. Termi-
nologically, old forms, concepts, and distinctions are abandoned. Ar-
ticle 9 applies to security interests created by contract including
pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's
lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title
retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security.
While traditional financing devices may still be used, distinctions be-
tween them based solely on the "form" used are largely abandoned in
favor of differentiations based on the status of the debtor and the kind
of collateral.
While the application of Article 9 is far broader than the field of
chattel mortgages, its provisions are contrasted in this paper with the
Illinois law on chattel mortgages to show the differences and similari-
ties in this important area of secured transactions.
The chattel mortgage is an old security device, not as old as the
pledge, by any means, but a logical extension of the pledge concept:
where a transfer of possession of property for security purposes is not
feasible and the property remains with the debtor, the recording of an
instrument setting forth the terms of the arrangement gives notice to
third parties of the secured party's interest. The Code terms "secured
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party" and "debtor" are at least as descriptive of the relationships in-
volved as "mortgagee" and "mortgagor."
As between the mortgagor and mortgagee in Illinois, probably few
if any formalities are necessary for a valid chattel mortgage. Where
rights of third parties are involved, it is necessary that possession be
transferred to the mortgagee or else, if the property is to remain with
the mortgagor, for an instrument so providing to be duly recorded or
filed.' The Code's requirements for an enforceable security interest
are substantially the same. The Code provides, roughly, that a secu-
rity interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties un-
less (1) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party or (2)
the debtor has signed a security agreement describing the collateral;2
and usually filing of a financing statement is required to perfect a se-
curity interest in collateral where possession is not transferred to the
secured party.3
No particular form is specified for the financing statement. It is suf-
ficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party, gives an
address of the secured party from which information about the secu-
rity interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor,
and contains a statement indicating the types or describing the items
of collateral. 4 A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a fi-
nancing statement if it contains this information and is signed by both
parties." Such a statement may be signed only by the secured party if
1 Ill. Rev. Stat, Ch. 95, S 1 (1959). A security interest in a motor vehicle is perfected,
on the "consumer" level, by certificate of title notation and delivery to the Secretary
of State. Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95 , S 3-202 (1959).
2 UCC S 9-203(1). (References are to the 1958 Official Text of The Uniform Com-
mercial Code with comments, hereinafter cited as UCC). Unless postponed by agree-
ment, a security interest attaches when an agreement is made that it attach, value is
given, and the debtor has rights in the collateral: UCC § 9-204 (1).
8 UCC § 9-302(1). Filing is not required to perfect a purchase money security in-
terest in consumer goods or in farm equipment having a purchase price not in excess
of $2500 unless the goods or equipment is a fixture or a motor vehicle required to be
licensed. Nor do the filing provisions apply to an assignment of a perfected security
interest, or to a security interest in property subject to federal registration, or to filing
of security interests where a state statute requires indication on a certificate of title
of a security interest, as in the case of motor vehicles [I1. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95 , 5 3-201
et seq. (1959)], and in the last case perfection can be had only by compliance with the
statute. See UCC §§ 9-302(1), (2), (3), (4).
4 UCC § 9-402(1). An acceptable form is set out in UCC § 9-402 (3). Where the col-
lateral is growing crops or fixtures, the statement must give a description of the real
estate concerned.
5 UCC § 9-402 (1). The security agreement may, of course, be cast in some tradi-
tional mold [UCC § 9-102(1) (a)] but the provisions of the Code will govern regard-
less of form.
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it is filed in a Code state to perfect a security interest in collateral al-
ready subject to a security interest in another jurisdiction which has
been brought into the Code state and the statement indicates such
facts."
In other words, the Code provides for simple notice filing. It is not
necessary that the instrument provide for possession of the collateral
to remain with the debtor or that it be acknowledged. An acknowl-
edgment of a chattel mortgage adds nothing whatsoever to its effect
or validity; it is simply a historical remnant worked into a patch-work
quilt of similar odds and ends in the field of secured financing. It is
anomalous that it should be required on a chattel mortgage in Illinois,
when there are no formal requirements whatsoever for the existence
of a sister security device, the conditional sale. 7 Under the Code, con-
ditional sales would be subject to the same requirements as other se-
cured transactions, so that this secret lien would no longer exist. The
provisions of Article 9 apply without regard to whether title to the
collateral is in the secured party or the debtor.8
In Illinois, a conveyance of personal property having the effect of
a mortgage or lien upon the property is a chattel mortgage,9 so that if
the parties have misnamed or misjudged their creation and failed to
comply with the statutory requirements for the creation of a valid
chattel mortgage, the conveyance will not be valid as to third parties,
regardless of notice.10 If a seller transferred possession of a refrigera-
tor to a buyer, he would be protected against third parties acquiring
subsequent rights in the chattel without recording any document what-
soever if the transaction were a conditional sale, but if it were a chat-
tel mortgage situation, third parties could acquire superior rights in
the chattel even though an instrument were recorded and they had
6 Or when the filing is to perfect a security interest in proceeds where collateral,
subject to a perfected security interest, has been sold. UCC S 9-402 (2). Consult also
UCC S 9-306. A security interest continues in collateral disposed of without authority
and also in identifiable proceeds, but the interest in proceeds ceases to be a perfected
security interest ten days after the debtor has received the proceeds unless: (1) a filed
financing statement covers proceeds as well as collateral or (2) the security interest in
proceeds is perfected before expiration of the ten-day period.
7 Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432, 149 N.E. 225 (1925).
8 UCC 5 9-202.
9 1. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, S 1 (1959). See Southern Surety Co. v. Peoples State Bank
of Astoria, 332 L. 262, 163 N.E. 659 (1928); Whittemore v. Fisher, 132 Il. 243, 24 N.E.
636 (1890).
10 Martin v. Duncan, 156 111.274,41 N.E. 43 (1895).
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actual notice of it, if it were not in proper form. 1 It is often said by
the Illinois courts that the chattel mortgage statute, being in deroga-
tion of the common law, is strictly construed. The results of a num-
ber of Illinois cases indicate that this is not always merely gratuitous
information.
The Illinois statute does not, as the Code does, require the addresses
of the parties. Nor does the Illinois statute require any particular de-
scription of the property, so long as third parties are able to identify
the property by means of inquiries suggested by the mortgage.' 2 The
Code does not require any specific description of the property either.
Whether operating under the Code or under the Illinois statute, how-
ever, ordinary prudence would suggest using as much particularity in
description as is feasible.
Since 1955 the Illinois statute has provided that a chattel mortgage
must be filed or recorded in the "proper county or counties" within
twenty days of its execution in order to be valid as against creditors of
the mortgagor, subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, or lienors, and
when duly filed or recorded, it is good and valid against such persons
from the time of filing or recording. 13 A properly executed and ac-
knowledged mortgage filed twenty-one days after its execution would
not be valid even against the creditors of the mortgagor who extended
credit after the mortgage appeared of record and who thus had con-
structive, or even actual, notice of the lien.14 There is no need to
penalize a secured party for late filing or recording merely to benefit
a class of third parties who were aware of the security interest, where
the secured party's failure misled no one. The Code adopts the more
realistic view that, where filing is necessary to perfect the security
interest, perfection dates from the time of filing. This would appear
perfectly equitable to all parties and misleading to none. It would
obviate the ordinary solution in Illinois of taking a new chattel mort-
11 In re West Counties Construction Co., 179 F.2d 467 (C.A. 7th, 1950); National
Cash Register Co. v. Riley Advertising System, 329 111. 403, 160 N.E. 545 (1928);
La Salle Mortgage & Discount Co. v. Horan, 307 Ill. App. 548, 30 N.E.2d 785 (1940).
12 United States v. Christensen, 50 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Ill., 1943); Melody v. Arcola
State Bank, 249 Ill. App. 85 (1928); Southern Illinois Nat. Bank v. Thaxton, 224 Ill. App.
554 (1922).
'1 Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, S 4 (1959).
14 Collateral Finance Co. v. Braud, 298 Ill. App. 130, 18 N.E.2d 392 (1938). The execu-
tion date is not necessarily the date stated on the mortgage. Execution is not effective
until the instrument is signed, acknowledged and delivered by mortgagor and accepted
by mortgagee. Illinois Nat. Bank v. Holmes, 311 Ill. App. 286, 35 N.E.2d 823 (1941).
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gage securing the antecedent debt, getting it promptly filed or
recorded, and then waiting four months to see if bankruptcy
intervenes. 15
There is no problem about when to record a chattel mortgage in
Illinois, but there may be a considerable problem about where. The
mortgage must be "filed or recorded with the recorder of the county
either in which the mortgagor resides, or in which the property is sit-
uated (if different from the county in which the mortgagor resides),
at the time when the instrument is executed and recorded and a certi-
fied copy of said instrument or a true and correct copy thereof sworn,
by the mortgagee, to be such and to have been filed as aforesaid, shall
be filed in such other county; or in case the mortgagor is not a resi-
dent of this State, then said instrument shall be filed in the county
where the personal property is situated at such time ... "16
Where there is a resident individual mortgagor residing in the county
where the property is located, there is no problem about where to re-
cord a mortgage, if the mortgagor and the property are in the same
county both at the time of execution and of recording. Nor is there
any problem when the mortgagor is a non-resident individual and the
property is located in only one county. The problems increase with
multiple individual mortgagors residing in different counties, as in a
partnership, or where the chattels are located in different counties or
are ambulatory. The statute simply does not answer satisfactorily the
multitude of questions which arise. It will probably be safe to file du-
plicate originals of the mortgage in every county where mortgagors
reside, both at the time of execution and recording, and certified cop-
ies in other counties where the chattels are also located at such times,
but this procedure is not clearly set forth in the statute, and if the
chattels are ambulatory the mere mechanics of recording or filing
may be quite perplexing. Whether to file or record is in itself some-
thing of a problem in the Illinois statute; the words are not always
used in the alternative.
The place of filing under the Code depends on the kind of collat-
15 McGraw, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, 42 Illinois Bar Journal 738,
740 to 741 (1954). A chattel mortgage given to secure a pre-existing debt is not void
as to other creditors. Whitaker Paper Co. v. Schrag, 21 M. App.2d 121, 156 N.E.2d 877
(1959).
16111. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, S 4 (1959). A mortgage executed by a public utility may in-
clude both real and personal property and will be a valid lien on the property, wher-
ever situated in the state, if recorded in the manner provided for real estate mortgages.
Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, S 1 (1959).
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eral involved. Insofar as the collateral could now be subject to a chat-
tel mortgage, the Code requires: If the collateral is inventory 17 or
equipment" (other than equipment used in farming operations), the
filing would be in the office of the Secretary of State and, in addition,
unless the debtor has places of business in more than a single county,
in the office of the recorder of that county where he has his business,
if any, and otherwise in the county of his residence; 19 if the collateral
is consumer goods, 20 equipment used in farming operations, or farm
products, 21 the filing would be in the office of the recorder of the
county of the debtor's residence, or if the debtor is not a resident of
the state then in the office of the recorder of the county where the
goods are kept and, in addition, when the collateral is crops, in the
office of the recorder of the county where the land is located on
which the crops are growing or are to be grown; 22 and if the collateral
is goods, which are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where
a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded.2
The greater detail and clarity of the Code provisions, contrasted
with current Illinois law, would make proper filing much more sim-
ple, but in the event that a good faith filing is made in an improper
place or not in all of the required places, the filing is still effective
with regard to any collateral as to which the filing complied with the
Code and with regard to collateral covered by a financing statement
against anyone who had knowledge of the contents of the financing
statement. 2
4
On intra-state removal of property, the Code provides that if the
17 "Inventory" is goods held by a person who holds them for sale or lease, raw ma-
terials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business; if goods are in-
ventory of a person they are not to be classified as his equipment. UCC 5 9-109(4).
18 "Equipment" is goods used or bought for use primarily in business (including
farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a govern-
mental subdivision or agency, or goods which are not included in the definitions of
inventory, farm products, or consumer goods. UCC § 9-109 (2).
19 UCC § 9-401 (1) (c). The provision for local filing may be omitted on enactment.
20 
"Consumer goods" are goods used or bought for use primarily for personal, family
or household purposes. UCC § 9-109(1).
21 "Farm products" include crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farm-
ing operations or products thereof in unmanufactured states, etc. UCC S 9-109 (3).
22 UCC § 9-401 (1) (a). This is an optional provision and if it is omitted, filing would
be in the office of the Secretary of State under UCC § 9-401 (1) (c), with the additional
omission of the requirement for local filing in UCC § 9-401 (1) (c).
23 UCC 5 9-401(1) (b).
24 UCC S 9-401(2).
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filing is made in the proper place, it remains effective even though the
debtor's place of business or residence or the location or use of the
collateral is thereafter changed. 25 This is usually considered to be the
law in Illinois, although there are no new cases on the problem and
the statute is silent.26
Where personal property already subject to a security interest is
brought into a Code state, the validity of the security interest is usu-
ally determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the property
was when the interest attached. 27 If the interest was perfected else-
where, it continues perfected in the Code state for four months and
thereafter if it is perfected in the Code state within the four-month
period. If the security interest is perfected after the four-month pe-
riod has expired, perfection dates from the time of perfection in the
Code state. If the security interest was not perfected under the law of
the jurisdiction where the property was kept before being brought
into the Code state, perfection dates from the time of perfection in
the Code state.28 Except for motor vehicles, which are regulated by
provisions similar to the Code, the Illinois law in this field is not clear.
The chattel mortgage statute does not provide for recording where
neither the chattel nor the mortgagor is in this state at the time of ex-
ecution or within twenty days thereafter. As a general rule, where the
mortgage lien has been properly perfected by the filing or recording
required by the state where the mortgage was executed and the prop-
erty was located at such time, the mortgage is usually enforced on the
principle of comity after removal of the property to a foreign state
25 UCC S 9-401(3). An alternative provision, which was adopted in its original form
in Pennsylvania [Purdon's Pa. Stat., Title 12A, S 9-401 (3) (1954)], states that a filing
made in the proper county remains effective for 120 days after the debtor's residence
or place of business or the location of the collateral is changed, but it becomes ineffec-
tive thereafter unless a copy of the financing statement signed by the secured party is
filed in the new county within that period. A change in use does not impair the effec-
tiveness of the original filing.
2 6 See Bailey v. Godfrey, 54 Ill. 507 (1870); Mumford v. Canty, 50 111. 370 (1869).
27 However, if the parties, when the security interest attached, intended for the
property to be kept in a Code state and the property was brought into the Code State
within thirty days, the validity of the interest in the Code state is determined by its law.
UCC S 9-103 (3). The language of the present Illinois Motor Vehicle Law is similar.
Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 951, S 3-202 (b), (c) (1959). Compare Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
S 265. In Vervaris v. Egan, 226 111. App. 500 (1922), a chattel mortgage was held void
as to third parties when the mortgage was filed in Cook County, Illinois, where the
mortgagor and chattel were at the time the mortgage was executed, but the mortgagor
was an Indiana resident and the property was customarily kept there.
28 UCC SS 9-401(4), 9-103 (3). Compare Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 951, S 3-201 et seq. (1950).
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without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee.20 If a statute of
the state of removal requires local recording of the mortgage to pre-
serve the lien, the statute may prevent operation of the rule of com-
ity,30 but no such statute exists in Illinois. Such statutes usually pro-
vide a time limit for recording within the state of removal, and third
parties cannot, within the time allowed, acquire rights superior to the
mortgagee, if the mortgage is finally recorded as required.3' Such is
the policy of the Code, and it would appear to be a desirable protec-
tion for local creditors and lienors, without putting an undue burden
on the mortgagee to look after his collateral.
Ambulatory chattels present exceedingly troublesome questions.
The Code attempts to solve the riddle of where to record by provid-
ing that the validity and perfection of a security interest and the ef-
fect of proper filing with regard to goods of a type normally used in
more than one jurisdiction (such as automotive equipment, rolling
stock, airplanes, road building equipment, commercial harvesting
equipment, construction machinery, and the like) are governed by
the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor's chief place of business
is located.32
If a debtor, a Delaware corporation having its chief place of busi-
ness in Illinois, is acquiring 10,000 ambulatory tanks for liquefied pe-
troleum gas storage and desires financing from an institutional lender,
the lender very likely will require security from the time the debtor
acquires title to the tanks, which might be in Pittsburgh. The tanks
might be designed for use and re-use throughout Illinois, Indiana, and
29 E.g., Pruitt v. Ferguson, 216 Ark. 848, 227 S.W.2d 944 (1950); Manufacturers Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Shaver Motor Co., 120 Ind. App. 178, 89 N.E.2d 81 (1949); Wisdom
v. Keithlcy, 237 Mo. App. 76, 167 S.W.2d 450 (1943). This principle seems to be well
recognized in Illinois: First National Bank of Clayton v. Lowery, 17 I11. App.2d 288,
149 N.E.2d 660 (1958); Bank of Nevada v. Swegler, 336 I11. App. 107, 82 N.E.2d 920
(1948); National Bond & Investment Co. v. Larsh, 262 Ill. App. 363 (1931); Bridges v.
Barrett, 126 111. App. 122 (1906). But see National Bond & Investment Co. v. Moss, 263
11. App. 187 (1931); and cf. Dawes v. Rosenbaum, 179 I11. 112, 53 N.E. 585 (1899);
Snow v. Breene, 248 Ill. App. 518 (1928); St. Paul Cattle Loan Co. v. Hansman, 215 Ill.
App. 190 (1919). In general, see Henson, Investments of Life Insurance Companies;
Mortgages on Ambulatory Chattels as Security, and Appendix thereto, Insurance Law
Journal, p. 225 (April, 1955).
30Associates Discount Corp. v. McKinney, 230 N.C. 727, 55 S.E.2d 513 (1949).
Contra: Ragner v. G.M.A.C., 66 Ariz. 157, 185 P.2d 525 (1947).
31 Ayores v. Maston, 78 Ga. App. 628, 51 S.E.2d 699 (1949); New v. Malone, 199
Okla. 639, 189 P.2d 177 (1947).
32 UCC § 9-103 (2). If the property is covered by a certificate of title on which a
security interest must be noted for perfection in the issuing state, perfection is gov-
erned by the law of the issuing jurisdiction. UCC § 9-103 (4).
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Iowa. If the lender took a chattel mortgage, where should it be re-
corded? Under the Code, the tanks would be "equipment" and the
secured party would file the financing statement in the office of the
Secretary of State of Illinois. Anyone wanting to know the status of
the debtor's property would have to look in only one place to find
the existence of the security interest. Under the present Illinois stat-
ute, there is probably no way to secure a valid lien by recording in
Illinois unless the chattels should be moved into the state within twenty
days after the mortgage has been executed, and the mortgage can be
recorded or filed within that time in the counties where the chattels
are located at that time. Even if this is done, the status of the lien is
doubtful because the statute requires recording in the counties where
the property is located at the time the mortgage is executed, as well as
recorded, and if the chattels are not in the state at the time the mort-
gage is executed, Illinois law might not be effective to require and
protect a recording in Pennsylvania, where the Code would require
recording in Illinois in any case. It is not certain that a foreign cor-
poration could be considered an Illinois resident for recording pur-
poses. 3 The Illinois statute was not designed to cover this kind of sit-
uation, and in the present state of Illinois case law, the outcome is
somewhat uncertain. It would not be beneficial to Illinois creditors to
protect a foreign filing on these facts.
Formerly a chattel mortgage could not be effective for more than
five years plus ninety days, which period might include one extension
if the debt matured in four years or less.34 This provision presented
numerous problems where a lender made one loan secured by both a
real estate and a chattel mortgage, and the term of the loan was over
five years. This difficulty has been alleviated by a change in 1955
which allows the filing of extension affidavits by the mortgagee, so
that in the event of a long-term debt, successive affidavits may be filed
33 Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Spaulding, 86 F.2d 256 (C.CA. 1st, 1936) at 258: "It is
generally held in this country, and particularly in the federal courts, that a corpora-
tion's residence is in the State of its incorporation 'and can be no where else.'" There
appear to be no Illinois cases on this point, but in the case of an Illinois corporation, its
registered office, as disclosed in its articles of incorporation, is its residence for record-
ing purposes. Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U.S. 642 (1915); In re National
Mills, 133 F.2d 604 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943). But see Garbe v. Humiston, Keeling & Co., 242
F.2d 923 (C.A. 7th, 1957) and compare Bristol v. C.& A.R.R. Co., 15 Ill. 436 (1854).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, § 4 (1953). A chattel mortgage, which, by its terms, matured
more than five years from date of recording was not void ab initio and was enforceable
by the mortgagee within the restricted period. In re Beale, 117 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Ill.,
1953).
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within five years and ninety days of the filing of the original mort-
gage and each successive extension, so that a mortgage may now be
valid for a total period of twenty years and ninety days from the date
of the first filing or recording. The mortgage will be effective, now,
until ninety days after its maturity date or five years plus ninety days
from the last previous filing of the original mortgage or an extension
affidavit, whichever is earlier.35 The Code provides the same general
arrangement: A filed financing statement is effective until its maturity
date, if less than five years, plus sixty days, or for a period of five years
from filing. Its effectiveness lapses after sixty days from such matu-
rity date or on the expiration of such five-year period, as the case may
be, unless a continuation statement is filed prior to the lapse, and such
a statement may be filed within six months prior to the lapse date.
Succeeding continuation statements may be filed for five-year periods
until the maturity of the obligation. The Code and the current Illi-
nois provisions limiting the effectiveness of a filing to five years, with
extensions allowed, appear reasonable in that, without limiting the
duration of the mortgage lien, they limit the period for which a search
of the records must be made to ascertain the existence of a lien or
security interest.
When an Illinois mortgagee has received full satisfaction, he is re-
quired, at the mortgagor's request, to execute a release which may be
recorded if the mortgage was recorded, or if the mortgage was filed,
the release is to be filed under the number of the released or with-
drawn mortgage.37 The Code requires a secured party to give a signed
statement, at the debtor's request, whenever the secured obligation
has terminated, and the filing officer will note the termination state-
ment on the index, mark the financing statement "terminated," and
send it to the secured party.8 The Code provides a penalty of $100
plus any other loss caused the debtor if the secured party fails to send
a termination statement within ten days after proper demand;3 9 the
Illinois statute provides a penalty of $50 for failure to give a release
85 111. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, S 4 (1959). Under a former statute providing that a renewal
affidavit had to be filed within ninety days after maturity of the debt, a renewal
affidavit filed four days before the mortgage was due was ineffective. McKesson-Fuller-
Morrison Co. v. Chapell Ice Cream Co., 285 Ill. App. 472, 2 N.E.2d 561 (1936).
86 UCC S§ 9-403 (2), (3).
ST Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, 9 (1959).
38 UCC S 9-404(1), (2).
39 UCC S 9-404(1).
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within a month after payment of the debt and request and tender of
the mortgagee's reasonable charges.40
One of the most significant changes the Code would make in Illi-
nois would be the validation of the so-called "floating lien."'" Quite
likely a valid lien could not be obtained on a shifting stock of goods
in Illinois under the present law which requires either the possession
of the mortgaged property to be transferred to the mortgagee or else
the mortgage must provide for the property to remain with the mort-
gagor. Even if such a mortgage were not void, the problem of de-
scribing the property would be practically insuperable. Where an Il-
linois mortgage is intended to cover after-acquired property, the only
ways the mortgagee can perfect a legal, as contrasted with an equita-
ble, lien are by taking possession of the chattels 42 or by taking a new
mortgage. The first method would not normally be practicable and
either method would probably create a lien which is subject to inter-
vening rights of third parties. The Code allows a security agreement
to provide that collateral under it shall secure future advances,43
which is not against public policy in Illinois, 4 but at the present time
a mortgage so providing should state on its face that future advances
may be made and the outside limit of such advances should be stated.45
In line with the simplifications made by the Code, the rule of Bene-
dict v. Ratner" is repealed: a security interest is not invalid or fraud-
ulent against creditors because the debtor has the right to use, com-
40 M1. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, S 11 (1959).
41 The floating lien is made possible by simple notice filing [UCC S 9-402] and by
the first-to-file priority rule [UCC S 9-312 (5) (a)] which usually applies in cases of
conflicting security interests in the same collateral, with certain exceptions in the case
of purchase money security interests [UCC S1 9-312 (3) and (4)]. Both of these pro-
visions provide practical implementation to the sections validating a security agree-
ment in after-acquired assets and expressly validating the security interest in a "shift-
ing stock." Consult UCC 5§ 9-204 and 9-205 and comments thereto.
42 Curtis v. Knox, 254 F.2d 433 (C.A. 7th, 1958); Southern Surety Co. v. Peoples State
Bank of Astoria, 332 111. 362, 163 N.E. 659 (1928); Titus v. Mabee, 25 11. 232 (1861);
Gregg v. Sanford, 24 Ill. 17 (1860); Hunt v. Bullock, 23 Ill. 258 (1860); Hansen v.
Bruckman, 152 111. App. 18 (1909).
43 UCC S 9-204 (5).
44 See, e.g., Frye v. Bank of Illinois, 11 111. 367 (1849).
45 McGraw, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, 42 Illinois Bar Journal 738,
742 (1954). Under real estate mortgages, obligatory future advances made within
eighteen months after the mortgage is recorded relate back to the original recording
date. ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 30, S 37a (1959). There is no comparable provision for
chattel mortgages.
46 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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mingle or dispose of part or all of the collateral or the proceeds from
the disposition of the collateral, or because the secured party has not
required the debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral.4 7
The Code and the Illinois statute seem to be striving for much the
same end result in the field of defenses available against assignees, but
the approaches are vastly different. Illinois requires notes secured by
chattel mortgages to so state on their faces and when endorsed or
assigned, the notes are subject to any defenses existing between the
original parties, and if the notes do not state on their faces the fact
that they are secured by a mortgage, the mortgage is void in the hands
of an assignee; but these provisions do not apply to notes made by
corporations.48 Where the maker of the note is an individual, if the
note does not state on its face that it is secured by a chattel mortgage,
the note should be enforceable by a holder in due course in the ab-
sence of real defenses, although the security will not be available to
such holder. Where the maker is a corporation, assignment or negotia-
tion of the note should carry the security with it, and the note, if
negotiable, should be enforceable according to the provisions of the
N.I.L. If the note remains in the payee's hands, it will not, of course,
be any more or any less enforceable whether it is or is not negotiable,
and whether it does or does not state that a chattel mortgage was
given for security.49
The Secured Transactions Article of the Code formerly did not
limit the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument
except in one situation; an agreement by a buyer of consumer goods,
in the contract for sale, that he would not assert against an assignee
any defense or set-off arising out of the sale was not enforceable by
any person, but where the buyer signed both a negotiable instrument
and a security agreement, even a holder in due course was subject to
defenses or set-off if he sought to enforce the security interest either
by proceeding under the security agreement or by attaching or levy-
ing upon the goods in any action on the instrument.5 ° The consumer
47 UCC § 9-205.
48 Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, § 26 (1959). Nor do these provisions relating to defenses on
notes apply after "assignment" of the notes, if they are secured by chattel mortgages
on livestock or agricultural crops, etc. Ibid. See Mattoon Grocery Co. v. Stuckemeyer
& Olson, 326 Ill. 602, 158 N.E. 422 (1927); Chance v. Hudson, 233 Ill. App. 542 (1924).
49 Ohio Power Shovel Co. v. Bond, 267 Ill. App. 271 (1932).
50UCC § 9-206(1), 1952 Edition as modified by supplement No. 1, 1955. In any
event the trend is probably away from holding a finance company assignee to be a
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thus retained the right to set-off on his defenses against an assignee
seeking to enforce the security interest but could not assert affirmative
claims when he had agreed not to. As revised, the Code provides that
subject to any local statute or decision establishing a different rule
for buyers of consumer goods and except for those defenses which
may be asserted against a holder in due course, an agreement by a
buyer that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense
available against the seller is enforceable by the assignee who takes
for value, in good faith, and without notice of the claim or defense.
A buyer who signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agree-
ment, as part of one transaction, is considered to have made such an
agreement not to assert claims or defenses.5 ' The Code further pro-
vides that when a seller retains a purchase money security interest
in goods, the Article on Sales governs the sale and any disclaimer,
limitation or modification of the seller's warranties.5 2 The palpable
intention of both the Code and the Illinois statute is the protection
of individual purchasers of consumer goods. The Code's scope is far
broader, however, since it applies to all secured transactions and not
just to chattel mortgages.
Probably because of its Topsy-ish development, the foreclosure
procedure in the Illinois statute is not a model of clarity. Certainly a
chattel mortgage may contain a power of sale, but one section pro-
vides that the mortgagor may insert a clause in the mortgage au-
thorizing the sheriff of the county where the property is situated
(presumably at the time of sale) to execute the power of sale granted
to the mortgagee, and at such sale, the mortgagee may purchase the
property,53 while another section provides that all sales under a power
of sale shall be made in the county where the mortgagor resides (ap-
parently at the time when the mortgagee takes possession of the prop-
erty) or where the property is situated when mortgaged. 54 In the
latter instance there is no specific requirement of a public sale, but
there are requirements that the mortgagor be given advance notice
holder in due course in the consumer finance field, even without statutory changes in
the law. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34
Cal.2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137
S.W.2d 260 (1940).
51 UCC § 9-206(1). The change has the effect of leaving to each state the treatment
to be given defenses to payment asserted because of defects in consumer goods.
52 UCC § 9-206 (2).
53 111. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, § 12 (1959). 54 1l1. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, § 27 (1959).
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of the sale as well as details of the sale within ten days after it is held,
and on failure to supply the required information on the sale, the
"owner" of the property may recover one-third of the "value" of
the property sold from the mortgagee or the assignee-seller, and no
such sale shall be valid as against the mortgagor's creditors unless the
mortgage is recorded at least five days before taking possession of
the property, and a sale made within five days of recording is fraud-
ulent and void as against the mortgagor's creditors.5 A chattel mort-
gage on household goods executed by a married person is not valid
unless the spouse joins in the execution, and a mortgage on necessary
household goods, wearing apparel, or mechanic's tools cannot be fore-
closed except in a court of record.56
Of course foreclosure and sale are not the exclusive means of satis-
fying an obligation secured by a mortgage. The mortgagee may bring
an action on the note to collect the balance due or else sue to recover
the property.57
Under the Code, on default a secured party may reduce his claim
to judgment, foreclose the security interest, take possession of the
collateral, sell the collateral and recover a deficiency, or accept, by
agreement, the collateral in discharge of the obligation. 8 The prin-
cipal difference between the Code and the present Illinois law is that
the Code is clear whereas an Illinois mortgagee cannot determine his
rights by reading the statutes alone and must resort to a considerable
body of case law.
The Code gives the debtor a right of redemption at any time before
the secured party has disposed of the collateral or entered into a con-
tract to dispose of it or before the obligation has been discharged by
retention of the property in satisfaction of the debt.5 9 There is no
provision for redemption in the Illinois statutes but courts of equity
recognize it to exist before foreclosure and sale.60
On default, the Code gives a secured party the right to take posses-
sion of the collateral, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, and
55 Ibid. The provisions of the Act do not apply to the "sale of furniture by regular
dealers on the so-called installment plan."
56 11. Rev. Star., Ch. 95, § 24,25 (1959).
57 Whittemore v. Fisher, 132 Ill. 243, 24 N.E. 636 (1890).
58 UCC i§ 9-501 (1), 9-503, 9-504,9-505.
59 UCC S 9-506.
6oWhittemore v. Fisher, 132 Ill. 243, 24 N.E. 636 (1890); Wylder v. Crane, 53 111. 490
(1870).
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possession may be taken without judicial process, if it can be done
without a breach of the peace.61 The collateral may be sold, leased,
or otherwise disposed of, either in its existing condition or following
commercially reasonable preparation, and the proceeds must be ap-
plied (1) to the expenses of retaking and selling the property, (2) to
satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by the security interest under
which disposition is made, and (3) to the satisfaction of indebtedness
secured by any subordinate security interest in the collateral, if de-
mand has been received before the proceeds have been distributed.
If there is a surplus the debtor is entitled to it, and if there is a de-
ficiency, the debtor is liable for it, unless otherwise agreed. The dis-
position may be by public or private proceedings. The secured party
is unfettered in his discretion so far as disposition of collateral is con-
cerned; the only test is whether the disposition is "commercially
reasonable. '6 2 The standard of commercial reasonableness is incapable
of precise definition, but it almost certainly would be more beneficial
to a debtor than a sheriff's sale of property under a chattel mortgage
power.
Unless the collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily
in value, or is a type customarily sold on a recognized market, the
secured party must give the debtor and other known secured parties
reasonable notice of the time and place of a public sale or the time
after which a private sale or other disposition is to be made. The
secured party may buy at a public sale or at a private sale, if the
collateral is of a kind whose price is easily established. Where the
purchaser acts in good faith or, in the case of a public sale, without
knowledge of any defects in the sale and without collusion, the
purchaser acquires all of the debtor's rights in the collateral, dis-
charged of the security interest under which the disposition is made
and all subordinate interests or liens, even though the secured party
has not complied with all requirements of the Code or of any judicial
proceeding in connection with the disposition.63 Of course, although
a purchaser is protected, the secured party remains liable to the debtor
or any other person entitled to notification for any loss caused by a
failure to comply with the Code's requirements. Where the collateral
61 UCC 5 9-503.
62 UCC S§S 9-504 (1), (2), (3) ; 9-507 (2).
63 UCC J 9-504(3), (4). In the case of consumer goods, notice to other secured
parties is not required.
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is consumer goods, the debtor has a right, in any event, to recover
not less than the credit service charge or time price differential plus
ten per cent of the cash price or principal amount of the debt.64
In the case of a purchase money security interest in consumer
goods, where the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the cash price or
in the case of another security interest in consumer goods, where the
debtor has paid sixty per cent of the loan, and has not, after default,
signed a statement renouncing his rights, a secured party who has
taken possession of the collateral must dispose of it within ninety
days or else he will be liable in conversion or under the Code for any
loss due to a failure to comply with the Code's requirements. In any
other case, a secured party in possession of the collateral may propose
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation by giving
written notice of such intention to the debtor and to other known
secured parties. If no objection is received within thirty days, the
secured party may hold the collateral or dispose of it free from the
requirements of Article 9. If there is an objection to retention, the
secured party must dispose of the collateral under the requirements
of Section 9-504 outlined above. 65
During the period when the debtor has possession of the collateral,
his rights are alienable.66 That this should be the case is inevitable
from the range of transactions covered by the Code, 67 but the se-
64 UCC S 9-507(1). The term "time price differential" is used in Retail Instalment
Sales Acts and Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Acts to mean the difference between the
cash price and the time price for the goods in question, usually automobiles. Such
statutes, in varying forms, have been enacted in Alaska, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Warren, Regu-
lation of Finance charges in Retail Installment Sales, 68 Yale Law Journal 839 (1959).
65 UCC 9-505.
G6 UCC 19-311.
67 As in the case of inventory financing. But the Code's security interest covers not
only the collateral subject to the agreement, but also the proceeds arising from the
debtor's sale or disposition of the collateral, although the interest in proceeds becomes
unperfected ten days after their receipt by the debtor, unless the original filed financ-
ing statement covering proceeds or a security interest in them is perfected within the
ten-day period. UCC S 9-306. This is comparable to provisions of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act [11. Rev. Stat., Ch. 121 , J 175 (1959)] and the Factors Lien Act
[Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 82, 5 107 (1959)]. UCC S 9-306 now states the secured party's rights
in proceeds in terms of perfected security interest rather than priority, perhaps to avoid
such problems as were raised in In re Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863 (D.C.
Tenn., 1955).
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curity agreement may, of course, provide that unauthorized disposi-
tion will be a default. In Illinois if the mortgagor makes a transfer
of the property without the mortgagee's Written consent, he may in-
cur criminal penalties.68
The Code recognizes that the debtor's rights in the collateral may
be reached by attachment, levy, garnishment or other appropriate
judicial process.69 An attaching or executing creditor of an Illinois
mortgagor can reach the mortgagor's equity of redemption, but can-
not interfere with the mortgagee's rights.70 The Code gives priority
to a person who furnishes services or materials, in the ordinary course
of his business, to goods subject to a security interest, unless the lien
is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise, 71 and this
is contrary to the Illinois view that an artisan's lien cannot have
priority over a recorded chattel mortgage, even though the mortgage
has a covenant that the mortgagor will keep the goods in "first-class
condition at all times at the expense of the mortgagor. "72
While by no means exhaustive, the comparisons discussed above
point out many of the important similarities and dissimilarities be-
tween Illinois chattel mortgage law and Article 9. It must be re-
membered that even though a particular security transaction cannot
be handled as a chattel mortgage in Illinois, although this might have
been the only possibility historically, some other financing means may
be found. For instance, the invalid mortgage on a shifting stock-and
"shifting" is doubly descriptive for some of the financed stocks-could
possibly be recast as a field warehousing transaction, or brought under
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act or the Factors Lien Act. The Code
brings a symmetry of treatment into the financing field where grand
confusion formerly grew.
The Code would require less re-education of the bar than is some-
times supposed. Satisfactory security agreements currently in use
could still be used under the Code, although some of the consequences
might be different. Where specific security interests are now advisa-
68 111. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95, § 8 (1959).
09 UCC S 9-311.
70 Pike v. Colvin, 67 Ill. 227 (1873); Spaulding v. Mozier, 57 111. 148 (1870).
71 UCC § 9-310.
72 Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311 Ill. 467, 468, 143 N.E. 61 (1924). A properly recorded or
filed mortgage is "good and valid .. .as against creditors of the mortgagor and sub.se-
quent purchasers, mortgages or lienors." Ill. Rev. Star., Ch. 95, § 4 (1959).
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ble, devices that provide them-such as chattel mortgages-could still
be used. The Code does, however, permit a debtor using one agree-
ment and one filing to subject all of its assets, present and future,
to a valid security agreement, if this is desirable. Whether the so-
called floating lien would ever be used is a matter of conjecture. A
security interest is good only to the extent of the "obligation" out-
standing, so that an onerous agreement does not tie a debtor's hands
indefinitely, and even though a debtor has given a floating lien on his
present and future assets, he may still acquire property subject to a
purchase money security interest. It may be doubted that the Code
would radically affect the secured financing of personal property,
but it would simplify the procedures and, where advisable, would
permit a fuller use of old techniques plus a few new ones. Many
problems raised by critics of the Code are purely theoretical and
have not been found to exist in actual practice.
Law, with its precious intricacies, does not exist for the lawyer
alone. In the financing field it must meet the needs of the business
world, protecting borrower and lender alike in an efficient and sensi-
ble way.
Professor Denis W. Brogan has recently remarked, with his usual
sageness, "... I am advocating the continual discussion in public...
of the necessary adjustments of the law to modem conditions, and
not leaving these adjustments entirely in the hands of laymen, or
politicians, or administrators, or businessmen, or union leaders, who
are very tempted indeed, because that is the nature of their education,
to choose the immediate, quick, short-term solution, which turns out
to be a solution that no free society will wisely accept and which,
even if the honest act of the administrator or businessman, or lawyer,
produces immediate practical and long-term social and political
evils." 73
It was argued in the hearings of the New York Law Revision
Commission that the Code would require "mass re-education of the
general public and that no one could, to quote the critic, 'contend
that the truck driver and grocery clerk, or even the small business-
man, can pick up Article 9 of this Code and get a quick, easy and
clear picture of the rights of borrower and secured lender,' " and
the Code's draftsmen replied: "We never thought anyone believed
78 Brogan, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. of T!H. Law
Forum 242, 249.
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that any layman could pick up any of our present security laws and
get a quick, easy and clear picture of what was involved therein.
Even those trained in the law sometimes have difficulty. ' 4
While much of the Code is simply a codification of existing law
and business practices, Article 9 is innovative. In some ways it is
complex and difficult to understand-although this is less true of the
Code than of the statutes it replaces-but once grasped it should
prove far more satisfactory in use, to both lawyers and their clients,
than the current hodge-podge of Illinois law regulating, or purporting
to regulate, the field. Comment from Pennsylvania, after several
years' experience with the Code, indicates it is operating quite satis-
factorily. Eminent Massachusetts lawyers agree. It is not the last piece
of legislation we shall ever need in the commercial field but it is the
best and most complete answer currently available.
74 Supplement No. 1, p. 176 (1955). While the New York Commission did not
recommend enactment of the Code in its form at the time of the Commission's study,
it was concluded, as to Article 9, that "Article 9 would accomplish a significant reform
of the law of personal property security. The Commission believes that the approach
taken by Article 9 as a whole is sound in theory and satisfactorily developed in most of
its elements." Report of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to
the Uniform Commercial Code, Legislature Document No. 65 (A), p. 90 (1956). The
Code has been in effect in Pennsylvania since July 1, 1954 (1952 Edition), and in
Massachusetts since October 1, 1958; it will become effective in Kentucky on July 1,
1960, in New Hampshire on July 1, 1961 and in Connecticut on October 1, 1961. The
following articles are of special interest in connection with security problems: Bane,
Chattel Security Comes of Age, 1 De Paul L. Rev. 91 (1951); Symposium on Chattel
Security Transactions, 1956 U. of Ill. Law Forum 531 et seq.; Symposium on the
Uniform Commercial Code and Illinois Law, 53 N.U.L. Rev. 381 et seq. (1958);
Trumbull, The Uniform Commercial Code in Illinois, 8 De Paul L. Rev. 1 (1958);
Coogan, Article 9 of The Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured
Creditors and The "Floating Lien," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838 (1959); Coogan and Bok, The
Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Corporate Indenture,
69 Yale L. J. 203 (1959).
